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1
It is now very well understood in philosophy that the relationships
that related but distinct theories bear to one another is a matter of
enormous complexity. Whatever the relationship is between a theory
and another that somehow or other “grounds” it, the terms ‘reduc-
tion’ and ‘supervenience’ and ‘emergence’ are all so broad in their
sweep that to say that one theory reduces to another, is supervenient
on another or emerges from another is never more than to begin to
tell the truly interesting story: Exactly how is the one theory related
the other. Often much of the most interesting philosophical insight
resides in the details of the specific cases rather than in categorizing
some particular inter-theoretic relation into one of the three broad
categories mentioned.
Much of the realization that inter-theoretic relations are as
complex as they are has come from the exploration of the relation
of the special sciences to one another and to physics. Exactly how a
conceptual scheme appropriate to deal with social communities is to
relate to individualistic psychology, and, notoriously, how a psycho-
logy replete with talk of states endowed with cognitive content and
with states endowed with perceptual content is to related to a theore-
tical account of the psychologically endowed as brain possessing
biological organisms embedded in their complex of relations with
other such organisms and with the physical world, has proven about
as intractable problem area as any in philosophy. Similarly the rela-
tionship biology bears to the underlying chemistry and physics of
living things has shown itself ever more complex the deeper our
understanding goes.
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But even within physics itself, the more we probe into inter-
theoretical relations the harder we find it to characterize them in
all but the most general terms if we want analyses of these relations
that will hold across numerous important cases. Instead we find that
the individual cases each present a complex of subtle details and that
it is in these details that much of the most interesting results lie in
trying to understand just how the one theory is related to the other.
This is true in both of two kinds of important cases. First there
is the situation where we have a kind of “replacement reduc-
tion.” In these cases we have a newer theory supplanting an older
theory, but where the older theory remains “true enough” in appro-
priate contexts so that we don’t want to speak of its being utterly
refuted (as are the theories, say, of crystalline spheres in astro-
nomy or caloric in thermal physics). Rather we think of the older
theory as being “reduced” to the newer alternative in some sense.
Second there are the cases where we think of the newer theory as,
if anything, providing even greater support for the older one, if,
perhaps the older one in a modified form, rather than showing us
the error of its ways.
In the first group of cases there is enormous variety. The rela-
tionship of pre-relativistic theories of space time and motion to the
spacetime theories of the special and the general theory of relativity
has been studied in great detail by physicists and philosophers. Here,
at least, some general patterns of the kind we would naively expect
antecedent to looking at the details can be found. Pre-relativistic
theory and the spacetime of special relativity can, for example, be
neatly related to one another by letting a parameter, the velocity of
light, go to infinity.
But other fundamental cases are much more problematic. Just
exactly how does pre-quantum dynamics relate to the quantum
theory? In a narrow class of special models within the theories
there is, once again, a neat “parameter limit” connection between
the descriptions of the case given by the two theories. But in other
cases getting straight just how the theories are connected requires
great subtlety indeed. The relation of a “wave” theory to one without
the characteristic wave phenomena, or of a theory framed in terms
of observables characterized by functions on phase points to one
where they are characterized by operators on a vector space, is
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still an area of intense scientific exploration. There is, for example,
active research dedicated to finding out just how to characterize at
the quantum level those systems characterized classically by chaotic
dynamics. All of which is not to recommend, of course, the counsel
of despair called “incommensurability.”
But there are deep problems with the other kinds of cases as well,
the cases where we think of the “reducing” theory not as supplanting
but as grounding the theory “reduced.” I’ll spend the rest of this
paper dealing with one such, particularly problematic, case.
2
Thermodynamics is the general theory of energy, whether in the
form of overt mechanical work or in the form of transferable heat,
and its transformations and inter-relations with the other macro-
scopic descriptive parameters of matter and radiation. It is a very
odd theory indeed. It doesn’t fit either into the class of “constitutive”
theories describing the various entities in the world and their struc-
ture. Nor does it fit into the scheme of the hierarchies of ever deeper
dynamical theories that describe the causal order among events at
deeper and deeper levels. Yet its idiosyncratic general principles,
especially the Second Law of Thermodynamics with its description
on an “irreversible,” time-symmetric world, is applicable across the
entire range of physical phenomena.
Statistical mechanics is equally peculiar. Once again it has
universal applicability across all of the domains of physics. Yet,
once again, it seems to have no place in the usual hierarchy of
constitutive or dynamical theories. It presupposes both of these in
essential ways. Two essential ingredients assumed by the theory are:
(1) The reductive account of macroscopic matter that views it as
being constituted of microscopic components that are related to one
another by various forces; and (2) An assumed theory of dynamics
that expresses the laws governing the time evolution of systems
composed of such components interacting in such ways. This latter
component of the theory was, originally, taken to be classical mech-
anics and is now taken to be the appropriate quantum dynamics for
the microscopic components of the system.
190 LAWRENCE SKLAR
Whether or not thermodynamics reduces to statistical mech-
anics, then, the very possibility of statistical mechanics rests
upon the presupposed identification of macroscopic matter with an
assemblage of microscopic parts, an identification essential to other
reductive aspects of physics.
What is most peculiar about statistical mechanics, though, is its
assumption of various probabilistic posits that, under most inter-
pretations of the theory, fail to have their complete grounding in
either the theory of the constitution of matter or in the underlying
dynamics. But the autonomy of such probabilistic posits, posits of
quite different kinds in different contexts of the theory, is itself a
matter of great controversy. It is, in fact, the status of these probab-
ilistic assumptions, central to the theory and possibly not importable
into it from other physical theories, that is the most problematic
element when one asks whether we ought to claim a reductive
relationship between thermodynamics and statistical mechanics. I’ll
return to this in the later sections of this paper.
3
If we want to speak of one theory as in any sense reducible to
another, and not just supervenient on the other, then we need to
understand the connections between the concepts of the reduced and
those of the reducing theories. There are, indeed, such inter-theoretic
conceptual relations between thermodynamics and statistical mech-
anics. But they have a complexity and variety that cannot be
summarized in any simple form.
Some of the concepts of thermodynamics, such as volume, pres-
sure and energy are imported into that theory from the outside –
from our general spatial language or from the language of dynamics.
Other thermodynamic concepts such as temperature and entropy
are novel to the theory. How do they acquire their meanings in
the theory? Their evolution as the theory develops shows a famil-
iar pattern. Some of them arise first as modes of description of
immediate experience (temperatures as hot or cold, for example).
Then that sense is removed from them and their meaning is fixed
by the measuring instruments used to determine their quantita-
tive values in a familiar operationalist way (temperature as that
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which is measured by a gas thermometer, for example). Then as the
theory becomes formalized their meanings are fixed by their role in
the basic assumptions of the theory (the place of temperature, for
example, in the Zeroth and Second Laws of Thermodynamics). In
the case of entropy (and many other related concepts), earlier stages
of meaning accrual don’t exist at all. The concept first appears in its
role as theoretical place-holder. Not surprisingly for the later uses
of concepts and for concepts that never had any meaning other than
their role in the theory, an analysis of their meaning something akin
to functionalist accounts of mental concepts is appealing.
For some of the thermodynamic concepts, their association to
concepts employed in statistical mechanics is, at least in part, fixed
by the fact that both theories exist in the context of surrounding
general kinematic and dynamical theory from which common terms
were imported into both theories. When we speak of the volume
of a gas in thermodynamics and look for the appropriate concept
to associate with that in statistical mechanics, we find in the new
theory that the spatial discourse has already been embedded and
that an inevitable statistical mechanical notion of volume exists to
be associated with the thermodynamic concept.
But even here we must be careful. For a concept such as volume
can function at the statistical mechanical level in much subtler ways
that it does in thermodynamics. In statistical mechanics we deal
with imagined collections of systems, or, more directly, with prob-
ability distributions over microscopic states compatible with some
constraint on systems such as fixed volumes or energies. Volume
could function as a constraint on such a collection of systems. Or
it might function, instead, as some quantity allowed to vary from
collection member to collection member, where the collection is
specified by constraints on its members not including fixed volume.
If the latter is the case, volume will be subject to all the probabilistic
aspects of statistical mechanics. That is observations of volume will
be connected to such things as mean or most probable values of
volume and fluctuations of volume as a measurable quantity will be
tolerated.
Here we encounter one of the fundamental features making the
relation of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics irremediably
complex. One of the theories is framed in fundamentally probabil-
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istic terms and the other, at least in its standard form, is not. So even
when we are pointed to an immediate association of concepts at the
two theoretical levels, that association can in no way be mediated
by some simple notion of alleged synonymy of terms or even of
property identification.
When we deal with the concepts of thermodynamics imported
from the more general physics of motion, that is to say kinematic
and dynamical concepts such as energy or pressure, the situation is
quite like that when dealing with volume. The statistical mechanical
theory imports concepts from general dynamics just as thermo-
dynamics does. Therefore which concept of thermodynamics is to
be associated with which concept of thermodynamics is once again
fixed to a degree by the physics external to both theories.
But, once again, no simple notion of synonymy or property
identification will tell the whole story. As an example consider
the transfer of energy into or out of a system. In thermodynamics
this can take two forms, either that of overt mechanical (or other)
work done on or by the system, or as the transfer of heat. But
the distinction between these two kinds of energy transfer, built
into thermodynamics just as the posit that energy as a whole is
conserved with heat transfer being what is left over when overt work
is subtracted from total energy transfer, becomes much more deeply
understood from the statistical mechanical point of view. Here work
becomes the “controllable” transfer of energy of the system as a
collective and heat the transfer of that part of the energy distrib-
uted over the microscopic constituents of a system in a “random” or
“uncontrollable” way. Making clear sense of this is no easy task, and
one that, once again, requires probing into the way in which probab-
ilistic considerations and dealing with probability distributions over
quantities of systems rather than with those quantities themselves is
central to statistical mechanics.
The problem of explicating the relationship between thermo-
dynamics as a non-probabilistic theory with probabilistic statistical
mechanics makes it one of those “special difficulties” in accounting
for inter-theoretic relationships. In this way, but only in this way, it
resembles the special problem encountered in trying to make sense
of the relationship between classical mechanics, which is devoid
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of wavelike aspects and the wavelike quantum mechanics to which
classical mechanics is supposed, in some sense or other, to reduce.
It might be added here that the central probabilistic aspect of stat-
istical mechanics has led, in a familiar way, to the reconstruction of
thermodynamics itself in a probabilistic manner. A theory of statist-
ical thermodynamics has been constructed that uses a small number
of elementary posits to introduce into thermodynamics itself a suffi-
ciently probabilistic aspect to make the relationship between this
newly reconstructed theory and statistical mechanics more direct
than that between traditional thermodynamics and statistical mech-
anics. Fluctuational phenomena, for example, now become overt
at the purely thermodynamic level. Needless to say, even when
so reconstructed, the relationship between thermodynamics and
statistical mechanics remains fraught with special problems.
4
When we move from the concepts, such as volume, energy and
force, imported into both theories from external physics to such
purely thermodynamic concepts as temperature and entropy, the
inter-theoretic conceptual relations take on a different aspect. In
these cases we have much less guidance from the outside about
which concepts available at the statistical mechanical level to associ-
ate with some purely thermodynamic concept at the thermodynamic
level. Among other things this sometimes leaves us with a situation
where a multiplicity of concepts that reside at the statistical mech-
anical level, and that are certainly not equivalent at the level, can
each be argued to be appropriately associated with a single thermo-
dynamic concept. Here the condition of appropriateness may itself
be context dependent in several ways.
The concept of temperature in thermodynamics has its mean-
ing fixed initially be the specification of appropriate thermometers,
temperature measuring devices, in the familiar operationalist way.
Later, and more importantly, the concept has its primary role fixed
by its functional place in the network of thermodynamic laws. Once
accept the notion of an equilibrium state for a system and then accept
a principle of transitivity for the relationship of one system being in
equilibrium with another, then a notion of empirical temperature as
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marker of equilibrium states follows. Add the Second Law and a
notion of absolute temperature can be derived as Clausius showed
relying on the work of Carnot.
When we move to statistical mechanics we see many subtleties
in trying to identify which concepts available in that theory ought
to be the ones associated, one way or another, with temperature in
thermodynamics.
One such subtlety will come as no surprise to philosophers. That
is multiple realizability. Systems of wildly divergent physical kinds
can all have equilibrium states and, when allowed to transfer energy
to one another, be in equilibrium with respect to each other. The
moving molecules in a blob of matter, for example, can form a
system in equilibrium with electromagnetic radiation. So we are
required to think of these systems as sharing common temperatures.
So a given temperature can be realized in radically different physical
ways. There is a clear resemblance between this multiple realization
in a variety of physical ways of property whose specification is func-
tionally given by the role played by a concept in a network of laws
and the claim that mental states embodying cognitive content could
achieve their realizations in a variety of physically unlike organisms.
And, just as in the case of the relationship between the mental and
the physical, this multiple realizability makes a too naïve claim of
the identity of the thermodynamic property with some single vari-
ant of one of its realizing physical properties misleading. We must
move to some subtler notion of context-relative identifications or
determinable-determinate relations. So much for “temperature just
is mean kinetic energy of molecules.”
The complexities introduced by the probabilistic nature of stat-
istical mechanics, though, have no counterpart in the mind-body
case. And they present a deeper challenge to understanding how
temperature in thermodynamics is to be related to temperature in
statistical mechanics than do the issues of multiple realizability.
One role temperature can play in statistical mechanics is as a
measure of some property instantiated in individual systems. In that
guise it is an ordinary sort of physical property. And it is subject to
the probabilistic, fluctuational behavior of most properties of indi-
vidual systems. The regularities in which it appears will now be
statistical regularities, and the association of these new laws with the
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traditional laws of thermodynamics will be less immediate than any
simple identification of the latter with the former. Heat, for example,
most certainly can, and does, flow from a colder to a warmer body
in an isolated system in the new probabilistic framework.
But the more important role for temperature in statistical mech-
anics is as a way of characterizing ensembles, that is as a para-
meter appearing in some appropriate probability distribution over
the microscopic states of individual systems. Here the relationship
between a specified temperature and an individual system is quite
indirect. One can think of such an individual system as having a
certain temperature, that is as being appropriately dealt with as being
a member of a collection of systems specified by a probability distri-
bution with that temperature as parameter, even if the individual
system has a temperature in the individual system sense wildly
divergent from the ensemble temperature. But with temperature,
and other thermodynamic quantities, thought of in this new way,
one may find in statistical mechanics new laws that match the older
laws of thermodynamics without any probabilistic qualification. The
“probabilism” has already been built in to the nature of the concepts
as ensemble parameters.
5
The connections between the thermodynamic concept of entropy
and those concepts of statistical mechanics associated with it are
of such complexity, and such importance, as to deserve special
attention on their own.
In thermodynamics the concept of entropy is defined solely by
its function in the theory. We have no direct phenomenal sense of
entropy, nor are there devices that serve as direct entropy measurers.
Crudely entropy measures the degree to which matter or energy is
spread out in a system. Gas spread throughout a box has a higher
entropy than gas confined to a portion of the box. A bar warm all
over has higher entropy than a bar with the same internal energy
concentrated in a hot end with the remainder of the bar cold. The
non-decrease of entropy in any process in an isolated system is, of
course, the most fundamentally special thermodynamic aspect of the
world, its asymmetry in time.
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What functions as the correlate of entropy in statistical mech-
anics? The only correct answer is: “Lots of different things.” For
different purposes, in different contexts, with different presuppos-
itions, many quite distinct concepts can all be identified as the
statistical mechanical entropy.
To begin with there is the distinction between entropy as a pro-
perty of a system and entropy as characterizing an ensemble, a
probability distribution, into which systems of a given kind are
assembled. This parallels the similar distinctions noted above and
once more gives rise to the distinction between properties that are
now thought of as fluctuating in an individual system and properties
that have the fluctuation structure built into their very definition.
The multiplication of entropies doesn’t stop there. In formal
thermodynamics entropy is a property that can be legitimately
assigned only to a system in equilibrium, although extensions to
non-equilibrium systems can sometimes be made. In statistical
mechanics one would like to assign entropy to systems not in equi-
librium and to then derive an appropriate increase of entropy for
an isolated system undergoing an irreversible change. But when
one applies to the description of non-equilibrium systems the most
natural property available to describe ensembles in statistical mech-
anics that one would associate with the thermodynamic entropy, it
turns out that it is easily provable that the quantity in question must
remain unchanged in any dynamic process.
Following an idea in Gibbs and implicit perhaps even in
Boltzmann, a new, “coarse grained” entropy is invented. When a
system is in equilibrium this coarse grained entropy will coincide
with the original “fine grained” entropy. But when constraints are
changed and a probability distribution changes under the dynamics
governing the individual systems in an ensemble, the coarse grained
entropy can nicely increase even if the fine grained remains provable
constant.
Dealing with this explosion of concepts is no easy task. First
one has to show that the coarse grained entropy will really do
what one wants it to do, that is to change in a way that will
correctly represent the irreversible dynamical change characteristic
of thermodynamic systems. Making that work requires the subtlest
considerations imaginable of both the underlying dynamics and of
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the initial probability attributed to the initial states of systems. On
top of that one needs to show that there are ways of construing this
new concept so that it is reasonable to associate its changes concep-
tually with the kind of changes observationally available to us when
macroscopic systems are observed. Neither the dynamics nor the
conceptual issues are settled matters, and the appropriate role for
such a coarse grained notion is still controversial in the foundations
of statistical mechanics.
But, the conceptual complexities don’t even end there. There
exist systems that can be forced to show apparent “anti-
thermodynamic” behavior. Despite the general irreversibility of
systems, fluctuation to the side, these unusual systems can show
behavior that seems to go the wrong way in time in terms of
the usual transition from order to disorder. How should they be
described at the statistical mechanical level? One choice is to stick
with standard definitions of entropy. One then simply denies the
universal validity of the Second Law of Thermodynamics, even
construed as a probabilistic regularity. But an alternative exists in
which one reconstrues the definition of entropy in the theory in
just such a way that the overall evolution of the system can be
considered one in which entropy never does decrease in the future
time direction.
It would be deeply misleading to ask which of the many entrop-
ies of statistical mechanics is the right one, or even to ask which
one corresponds or can be identified with the familiar entropy of
thermodynamics. Once the newer theory is available to us we realize
that the world is much more complicated that we originally thought,
and that a richer conceptual scheme is needed to deal with all its
aspects.
Despite all of this let me state my strong disagreement with
any claim to the effect that such complex relations between the
theories at the two levels can be dealt any kind of justice by taking
about incommensurability. It is not the absence of meaning rela-
tions between the theoretical terms of the two theories we are taking
about. To the contrary, it is the just the richness and complexity of
such meaning relations that require our attention if we are to make
any kind of reasonable appraisal of the vague claims that the one
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theory is or is not reducible to the other or to the effect that there is
some kind of emergence going on.
6
In terms of the relation of concepts at the supervenient level to those
at the grounding level, then, the relationship of thermodynamics
to statistical mechanics is neither one of a simple concept-concept
association nor that of there being concepts at the supervenient level
that have no natural correlates at the grounding level. Instead there
is a network of complex relationships between the concepts of the
older theory and a proliferation of novel concepts in the newer.
A series of questions, perhaps more profound than those dealing
with conceptual relations between the theories, centers around the
issue of whether it is correct, and if so in what sense it is correct,
to think of thermodynamics as being supervenient in any sense on
statistical mechanics. It isn’t clear how to answer these questions at
the present time. For one thing, there really isn’t any general agree-
ment about just what the theory of statistical mechanics is. And the
disagreements here are such that they entail serious disagreement
about the extent to which the thermodynamic regularities, including
irreversibility, can be thought of as being explained in any way by
resort to statistical mechanics.
One version of statistical mechanics seeks its probabilistic nature
and its irreversibility in the irreducibly probabilistic and irrever-
sible nature of some fundamental dynamical law of nature. Once
upon a time aspects of radiation were suggested as doing the trick.
At other times quantum mechanics was suggested as supplying
the needed asymmetrically, chancy aspects of the world. The most
plausible candidate now is a highly speculative theory introduced
originally to account for the mysterious process of measurement
in quantum mechanics. This Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber theory intro-
duces a lawlike, stochastic process that is time reversal non-invariant
and that disturbs what would otherwise be the deterministic evolu-
tion of the wave-function described by quantum mechanics. It is
this disturbance that can make macroscopic systems really collapse
into eigenstates whereas microscopic systems remain happily in
superpositions. Recently David Albert has suggested that the GRW
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process – if it is real – might account for some of the stochastic
irreversible aspects of statistical mechanics as well.
If this were so, and believing that it is so requires both believing
that the GRW theory is true and that it can do the job allotted to it
by Albert, we would then have a pretty clear case for the superveni-
ence of thermodynamics on an underlying fundamental dynamical
theory. Since that underlying theory would be irreducibly tychistic,
there would be some interesting variation here on the usual super-
venience theme, but nothing, I think, that would lead us to believe
that some real kind of lack of supervenience of a plausible sort could
be alleged.
Another interpretation of statistical mechanics might serve to
ground an uncomplicated supervenience claim if it were correct.
There have been some, Prigogine for example, who would argue
that our positing of exact microscopic dynamical states for systems
is a false idealization. From this perspective there are no such
exact dynamical states. Instead each individual system has as its
dynamical state at a time something that can be correctly charac-
terized itself by a probability distribution over a range of ordinary
dynamical microstates.
What this interpretation amounts to is far from clear, since we
are never told exactly how to think of the irreducible “spread”
microstates of individual systems. In addition, there are a number
of reasons for thinking the interpretation untenable. In a number of
contexts the need for thinking of the exact microstates of the tradi-
tional theory as genuine seems strongly supported. But were such
an interpretation both intelligible and true, it seems likely that some
claim of immediate supervenience would hold between the statist-
ical mechanical theory so interpreted and the theory of macroscopic
thermodynamics.
But what should we say if we adopt the most common, orthodox
interpretation of statistical mechanics? Here one takes it that one
cannot find the source of the fundamental probabilities of statist-
ical mechanics in any tychistic nature of the underlying dynamical
laws. And systems are viewed as having the exact microstates
posited by the underlying dynamics. Where then is the source of
the probabilistic nature of the theory?
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It is most often taken to be in the distribution over initial condi-
tions of systems prepared in a non-equilibrium state. Although
some quasi-probabilistic consequences can be derived from the
dynamics alone, both in equilibrium and non-equilibrium theory,
in the form of ergodic theorems or theorems about the “mixing”
nature of a system, the general consensus is that one cannot get the
full non-equilibrium theory without making some basic posit about
frequencies or proportions with which initial conditions are real-
ized in the world when the system is prepared in a non-equilibrium
condition. Only with such a posit can we get the appropriate probab-
ilistic evolution toward equilibrium with its characteristic relaxation
time and characteristic flow behavior.
But why are initial conditions distributed in the way they are?
It is here that there seems to many to be an ineliminable posit in
the theory that has its origin outside of anything we can say about
how the systems are constituted, how they are prepared, or how
the dynamical laws govern their evolution. It is this, I think that is
the primary reason that so many practitioners in the field are wary
of claiming any genuine kind of reducibility in the underpinning
of thermodynamics by statistical mechanics. The implicit thought
seems to be that the very nature of statistical mechanics requires
that we make in it a basic assumption whose independence of the
remainder of physics at that reductive level almost makes it looks as
though we are presupposing a kind of thermodynamic truth rather
than deriving it.
Unless we can discharge such a posit about distribution of initial
conditions, many seem to think, it is misleading of us to think that
the fundamental thermodynamic truths have really been explained.
Rather, they have been assumed at the lower level theory in a novel
form in the posit about proportions among initial conditions that is
super-added to all the remaining physics dealing with how macro-
scopic things are made up out to their microscopic parts and how
these microscopic parts behave in a lawlike way.
There is more, then, to the suspicions about the irreducibility of
thermodynamics to statistical mechanics than the kind of objection
to irreducibility that comes about from the fact that the concepts
of the special science have no natural correlate in the concepts
framing the more universal theory. In the thermodynamics-statistical
THE REDUCTION(?) OF THERMODYNAMICS 201
mechanics case there are indeed important questions about type-
type relations. But there are natural associations of concepts at the
thermodynamic level with those of the statistical mechanical level
complex as they may be. It isn’t at all like the relation of the “theory
of furniture” to the theory of atoms.
It is the curious need for a posit at the lower level that seems to
come from nowhere as far as the lawlike structure of that lower level
is concerned that makes a kind of emergentist claim for the thermo-
dynamic nature of the world appealing to so many. Incidentally all
of this occurs before one ever gets into the most famous question
of all about the probabilistic distribution of initial conditions, that
is, its time asymmetry. Even before one gets to that notorious issue
the problem of the source of natural proportions for classes of initial
conditions arises.
7
There is one final matter to note that casts serious doubt upon
claims that thermodynamics reduces to statistical mechanics in any
simple minded way. In order to carry out the program of non-
equilibrium statistical mechanics, we must be able to specify some
appropriate initial probability distribution over the microstates of a
system. It is in the evolution of such an initial probability distri-
bution that the description of the approach to equilibrium resides.
Deriving this evolution is a complicated task. First of all, most
standard derivations impose a re-randomization posit (some “Hypo-
thesis of Molecular Chaos”) whose very consistency with the laws
of dynamics governing the constituents of the system may be in
doubt. A rigorous theory would dispense with such a posit, but there
is very little in the way of rigorous theory in existence.
But how can we fix on the appropriate initial probability distri-
bution? For most non-equilibrium conditions of systems we have no
idea. There are only a limited class of cases where any plausible
proposal can be made about such an initial statistical posit. How are
these cases discovered? Basically by a combination of experimental
experience with the standard thermodynamic ways of characterizing
experience.
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If a system is close to equilibrium, a plausible way of generating
initial ensembles exists. If the system is far from equilibrium, but is
such that small enough pieces of it can be thought of as close to equi-
librium for short enough times, then, once again, plausible rules for
generating initial probability distributions can be proposed. But we
have virtually no guides from the underlying mechanical or statist-
ical mechanical theory as to when such local equilibrium conditions
will exist or what they will be like. It is only in already established
thermodynamic (and hydrodynamic) description of experimentally
tractable systems that we find our guidance about which systems can
even get a statistical mechanical description and our guidance as to
what that description will be like.
Of course once the new level of statistical mechanical description
has been imposed, we gain new insights unattainable at the purely
thermodynamic level. In particular, whereas the thermodynamic
description relies on the assignment of values of parameters (such
as thermal conductivity, viscosity, etc.) obtained by experiment,
in the fuller statistical mechanical account these may be derivable
by theory from the underlying constitution of the system and the
dynamics of the micro-constituents. But the fact that when the stat-
istical mechanical treatments exists, and how they are to be framed
when they do, is guided solely by the existing thermodynamics and
experiment, and has no derivation from fundamental theory, makes
a claim of reducibility of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics
dubious in a fundamental way.
POSTSCRIPT
A more extended treatment of the issues discussed in this paper can
be found in chapter 9, ‘The Reduction of Thermodynamics to Stat-
istical Mechanics’, of the author’sPhysics and Chance: Philosoph-
ical issues in the Foundations of Statistical Mechanics(Cambridge
University Press, 1993). The “Further Readings” section at the end
of that chapter provides an annotated guide to further reading on the
issues dealt with here.
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